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Also see Stigler.
Das, Chappell, and Shughart also find support of the production flexibility model.
For more details, see Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison.
Price data is Shipment Price Index (1982 = 100) collected from U.S. Department of
Commerce (1989).
. .
. t f V . t"
Standard Dev1at1on
Coe ffi1c1en o aria ion = 100 x
Mean
PV is a (163xl) column vector and ISV is also a (163xl) column vector because the data
set comprises 163 manufacturing industries; MS, (1=1,2,3,4) is a (1793xl) column vector
and same is true for KSR1 ( 1=1,2,3,4). [There are 163 manufacturing industries in each
year and the study period is 1978 to 1988. Hence MS, and KSR1 are all (1793xl) column
vectors.] So that the dimensions of MS, and KSR, are compatible with those of PV and
ISV, the average values of MS 1 and KSR1 for the eleven years have been calculated.
Before estimation it is necessary to stack the four size categories under one another.
The first-size category (smallest) is stacked at the top. Under the first-size category
the second-size category is stacked. The third-size category is stacked under the
second-size category and the fourth-size category (largest) is stacked at the bottom.
Each of the variables (PV, MS, KSR, ISV) is therefore a (652xl) column vector.
D 1 = Dummy variable denoting first size category (smallest). The smallest size
category consists of firms with $0-1 million in assets; D 2 =Dummy variable for firms
with $1-10 million in assets; D3 = Dummy variable for firms with $10-50 million in
assets; D 4 =Dummy variable for firms with $50-100 million in assets.
D 2 MS =Interaction ofD 2 and MS (D;MS); D 3MS =Interaction ofD 3 and MS (D/MS);
D 4 MS =Interaction of D 4 and MS <D;Ms).
All variables are in natural logarithms.
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Socially Efficient Control of
Carcinogen Emissions from Open
'lbp Vapor Cleaners in lndiana1

ROBERT S. MAIN
Butler University

Emissions of air pollutants have been a matter of concern for
many years. Section 112 of the 1970 Clean Air Act directed the Environmental Protection Agency to establish national emissions standards for
hazardous pollutants (NESHAPS). By the late 1980s only sevenNESHAPS
had been established by the EPA under the authority of section 112.
Dissatisfaction with the slow progress of regulation led to passage of much
more stringent provisions in the 1990 revisions of the Clean Air Act. Under
those provisions, 189 toxic pollutants are to be listed and controlled by the
maximum achievable control technology (MACT). The goal of the regulations is the reduce emissions of these chemicals by 90% below uncontrolled
levels by 2003. Many of the listed pollutants are carcinogens, and one
source of some of these carcinogens in the atmosphere is industrial vapor
cleaners. Some of these machines use carcinogenic solvents which escape
into the atmosphere, and these solvents are to be listed and controlled by
the EPA. In November 1992, the EPA is expected to publish new regulations for the solvents used in vapor cleaners. The expectation by state
regulators is that emission reductions of approximately 90% will be
ordered by the EPA.
Optimal control of an airborne carcinogen requires that each source
of the carcinogen be controlled to the point where the Marginal Cost of
Controlling emissions (MCC) is e11ual to the Marginal Damage from
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emissions (MD) that applies to that source. The MCC is likely to increase
as the degree of control increases, and the most reasonable assumption
seems to be that the MD is a constant for any given source. Thus, there will
be a unique optimal level of control for a given source. Both the MCC
function and the MD are likely to differ among sources, however. This
means that the optimal amount of control will generally differ from source
to source. Consequently, a uniform percentage reduction in emissions or
a uniform rule for the type of control to be installed will be inefficient.
Because MD's differ among sources, even a uniform emission charge
would be inefficient. 2
This paper examines the benefits and costs of controlling emissions
from open top vapor cleaners in Indiana. Making use of EPA engineering
estimates of costs and effectiveness of a variety of control technologies, I
estimate a marginal control cost schedule for several representative cases.
Using Indiana data on the location of open top vapor cleaners, and the
GEMS (Graphical Exposure Modeling System) computer program for
estimating exposure to risk by the population surrounding each source, I
estimate the dollar value of the damage to society from the emission of
each pound of solvent for each location. There are three main empirical
results. First, the marginal control cost schedule is a step function, and in
each of the eight hypothetical cases examined, the first branch exhibits
negative marginal control cost. This means that it is in the financial
interest of owners to install at least some controls. Second, because of
differences in population density in the areas surrounding different
sources, there is substantial variation in the marginal damage caused by
the emission of a pound of pollutant, depending on the location of the
source. Third, in six of the eight hypothetical cases examined, the first
positive branch of the marginal cost of control schedule exhibited a
marginal control cost above any plausible value for marginal damage. For
these cases, the socially optimal amount of control would be carried out by
profit-maximizing firms. For the others, socially efficient control is only
slightly more stringent than that which would be carried out voluntarily.
Furthermore, this optimal control is invariably less stringent than that
proposed in the 1990 Clean Air Act.
Many manufacturing firms use machines called vapor cleaners to
clean metal parts during processing. Vapor cleaners use special solvents
(often carcinogens) to clean metal parts. In an uncontrolled environment,
the vaporized solvents escape into the atmosphere, causing risks to
persons in the vicinity of the facility. The amount of emission depends on
how the machine is used (i.e., how many hours per week the machine is
used to clean parts, how many hours it is turned on but not actually
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cleaning parts (idling), and how many hours it is turned off) since
emissions occur at different rates for different types of use. There are
numerous control technologies that can be used individually or in combination to slow the rate of evaporation of the solvents (the EPA has
proposed six such technologies). Because it is costly for firms to replace
solvent lost from vapor cleaners, it may be privately efficient for them to
install systems which recover some of the solvent. This is because the
dollar value of the solvent recovered by using a control technology might
exceed the cost of installing and using that technology. If this were to
happen, the marginal cost of control would be negative for that control
technology. However, because there is an externality, the socially efficient
amount of control may be greater than the amount that it would be
profitable for an unregulated firm to install. This would happen if the
marginal damage were higher than at least some of the positive branches
of the marginal control cost schedule.
Although it is possible to install any combination from one to six of the
available controls on any machine, the proportional reduction in emissions is not the sum of the proportional reductions which the individual
technologies would yield. Suppose controls 1 and 2 would separately
reduce emissions by R = 90% and R 2 = 20%, respectively. Then the
1
reduction obtained by installing controls 1 and 2 together would be R 1 +
(1- R)*R =R + R - R *R =.9 + (1-.9)* .2 =.92. Similar expressions apply
2

1

2

1

2

to any combination of controls.
The EPA document3 provides the information necessary to estimate
the annualized cost of installing any control technology, given the operating schedule and given the size of the unit. Using the EPA estimates of
proportional reductions in emissions for each of the control technologies,
and assuming a particular operating schedule (a certain number of hours
per year working, a certain number idling, and a certain number shut
down) one can calculate the total reduction in annual emissions and the
annual cost that could be expected from installing any package of one or
more controls.
My procedure for calculating the Marginal Control Cost (MCC) is to
determine the lowest cost order in which to add controls. First, assume a
certain operating schedule (i.e., a certain number of hours of cleaning,
idling and shut down) with no controls in place. Calculate the annual cost
for each control technology alone. Calculate the recovery of solvent for
each control technology alone. Calculate the recovery of solvent that each
control would provide if applied alone. Net out the dollar value (evaluated
at the purchase price) of the recovered solvent from the gross cost. Divide
the net cost by the amount of recovered solvent (in pounds). Choose the

~
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technology with the lowest cost per pound. That cost is the first "step" of
the Marginal Control Cost schedule. With that technology assumed in
, place, recalculate the net cost per pound of additional recovery for the
remaining technologies. The net cost per pound for each of the remaining
technologies will be no lower than it would have been in the first round,
and it will be higher for any technology which controls the same kind of
emissions as the first technology chosen. Since the first technology chosen
had, by construction, the lowest cost per pound of any technology, given ;
no prior control, the lowest cost per pound of the remaining group must be
higher than that for the first technology chosen. Thus successive steps of
the MCC schedule must be ascending. Continue to add technologies from
those remaining until all have been employed. The cost per pound of
reducing emissions using each successive technology represents the
contingent marginal cost (contingent on having employed the least costly
4
contingent strategy in each previous step).
One unusual result of the calculation of Marginal Costs for controlling
emissions from open top vapor cleaners is that the first technology
employed has a negative marginal cost in each of the eight hypothetical
cases examined. As noted above, this happens because the dollar value of
the solvent recovered because of control exceeds the gross cost of the first
stage of control. Thus it would be in the interest of owners to undertake
some control even ifit were not required. Note also that, because of the way
I constructed it, the Marginal Control Cost rises as the degree of control
increases. Additionally, as one approaches 100% reduction in emissions,
the Marginal Control Cost rises dramatically (in one case to over $20 per
extra pound of emission reduction). While it would be possible in every
case I studied to employ enough controls to reduce emissions by at least 1
80% (and usually more than 9(Yl/o), the rapidly rising Marginal Control
Cost schedule means that this would be inefficient unless the Marginal
Damage from emissions was exceedingly high.
The results of using the EPA's control effectiveness, cost and operating schedule assumptions are shown in Table 1. The table shows eight
MCC schedules. This corresponds to the possibilities when there are two
possible operating schedules, two possible sizes of machine, and high and
low estimates for the control effectiveness of some control technologies.
Figure 1 illustrates graphically how the MCC increases as successive
controls are added for case 1.
1

1

TABLE 1
Marginal Cost of Control Schedules for Eight Scenarios
Case
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Stepl

Step2

Step3

%

MCC

%

MCC

%

MCC

Red.
21.0
20.4
21.0
19.3
26.6
26.6
66.4
66.4

-.22
-.21
-.32
-.31
-.10
-.10
-.34
-.34

Red.
50.9
41.9
73.4
73.1
54.6
54.6
81.9
74.4

.32
.38
-.25
-.25
-.05
-.06
.14
.21

Red.
78.9
69.9
84.6
79.5
70.0
70.0
90.0
81.l

.60
.60
.40
.99
.001
.01
.21
.27

Step5

Step4
%

Red.
85.8
77.0
92.7
87.5
85.8
81.0
92.7
88.5

Step6

MCC

%

MCC

%

MCC

1.98
2.58
1.52
1.52
El
1.17
1.23
.67

Red.
92.1
85.2
95.8
92.3
91.l
85.2
95.8
92.3

7.76
6.48
7.45
4.72
2.86
4.33
2.11
1.80

Red.
93.0
86.4
96.5
93.0
92.4
86.4
96.5
93.0

24.16
16.37
15.18
14.91
6.66
7.15
5.98
5.87

Case 1: Small, Op. Sched. A, High Est.
Case 2: Small, Op. Sched. A, Low Est.
Case 3: Small, Op. Sched. B, High Est.
Case 4: Small, Op. Sched. B, Low est.
Case 5: Large, Op. Sched. A, High Est.
Case 6: Large, Op. Sched. A, Low Est.
Case 7: Large, Op. Sched B, High Est.
Case 8: Large, Op. Sched. B, Low Est.
Small= 4.5 sq. ft. in area; Large= 16.0 sq. ft. in area. Op. Sched. A= Work 2 hrs.
per day, five days per week; idle 6 hrs. per day, five days per week; shut down the
rest of the time. Op. Sched. B =Work 12 hrs. per day, five days per week; idle 4
hrs. per day, five days per week; shut down the rest of the time.

Fig. 1. Marginal Control Cost Schedule for Casel.
MCC
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Because of the cooperation of the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM), I was able to obtain data on the location,
size, hours of operation, current controls of place, type of solvent used, and
many other facts about the open top vapor cleaners in use in Indiana. In
addition, I employed the PC version of the Graphical Exposure Modeling
Systems (PC-GEMS). This program, developed under contract to the
EPA, uses location of the source, height of the exhaust stack, type of
solvent, speed at which pollutants exit, and quantity of emissions to
estimate the ambient concentration of the solvent in regions surrounding
the source. Using population density in the surrounding regions and
cancer dose-response estimates for the solvent, GEMS then calculates an
estimate of the number of cancer deaths the persons surrounding the
source could be expected to suffer during their lifetime due to one year's
exposure to the solvent at the ambient level that results from that source's
annual emissions. If one multiplies this by an assumed dollar value forthe
saving of a "statistical" life, the result is the total dollar value of cancer
damage from a year's worth of emissions from the source in question. To
obtain the damage per pound emitted (Average Damage), divide by the
number of pounds emitted in one year. Since the dose response curve is
usually assumed to be linear, the Average Damage will be constant and
equal to the Marginal Damage.
For illustrative purposes, I assumed a value oflife-saving of $3 million
per life. 5 Assuming the solvent is Trichloroethylene (the most common of
the carcinogenic solvents con,sidered), the Marginal Damage per pound
emitted;t>er year ranges from $.001 to $.04, with an average of $.014.
Except for the two cases of the large lightly used cleaner, these Marginal
Damages fall below the lowest positive Marginal Control Costs.
Although exposure factors differ among sources by a factor of about
45, the optimal amount of control of open top vapor cleaners in Indiana is
usually unaffected by the level of exposure. In most cases, the amount of
control that would be undertaken by a well-informed profit-maximizing
firm is the socially optimal amount. This is because (with "reasonable"
assumptions) the Marginal Damage caused by the emission of a pound of
solvent is usually substantially less than the level of Marginal Control
Cost when it first becomes positive. The policy implication seems to be that
the best strategy, at least in Indiana, is to inform owners of open top vapor
cleaners of the benefits, in the form of reduced solvent purchase costs, of
certain controls, depending on the size and operating schedule of the
machine. Then they should be allowed to decide for themselves what the
proper level of control is.
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I wish to thank the Holcomb Research Institute (HRI) for generous support of this
project during the summer of 1989. I also wish to thank the Indiana Department of
Environmental Management (IDEM), particularly Bob Bierman and Barry Titus,
without whose help and encouragement this project would have been impossible. In
addition, I wish to thank an anonymous referee and Albert Nichols for valuable
comments and J. Patrick Meister for research assistance and counsel. Candee Carter
generously helped me understand how vapor cleaners are used in practice. The
opinions expressed in this paper are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of HRI
or IDEM, nor should they be held responsible for any errors.
Nichols, Targeting, Chapter 6, especially pp. 85-86.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Alternative Control Technology Document.
Albert Nichols has pointed out to me that this procedure only approximates the true
marginal cost of control schedule. It ignores the possibility of intermediate steps in the
control process. For example, suppose uncontrolled emissions are 100, and there are
two control technologies, A and B. Suppose A alone would reduce emissions by 80 at
a cost of $400, or $5 per unit, while B alone would reduce emissions by 90 at a cost of
$630, or $7 per unit. My procedure would have two steps. The first would be to reduce
emissions by 80 with a marginal control cost of $5 per unit (A), and the second would
be to increase control from 80 to 98, by adding control B to control A, at a marginal cost
of $35 per unit. Nichols points out that an intermediate step would be to employ B
instead of A and increase control from 80 to 90, at a marginal cost of$23 per unit. Then
the move from an emission reduction of90 to 98 would be accomplished by adding back
control A, at a marginal cost of $50 per unit. My $35 marginal control cost is the
weighted average of $23 and $50. Thus my approach is cruder than the correct
approach. Instead of three steps of $5, $23 and $50, my marginal control cost schedule
has two steps of $5 and $35. This could perhaps increase the amount of control which
firms would carry out on their own, but it would not change the main conclusions of
the paper.
Nichols, Targeting, at 136, argues that it is difficult to rule out values per life saved
of from several hundred thousand dollars to several million dollars. A figuce of $1
million to $2 million in 1980 dollars, while high, is not completely unbelievable. Thus
a figure of $3 million in 1989 dollars is, while probably on the high side, conceivable.
Note the reasoning used by Bailey, Reducing.
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